gangtise-copilot
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly instructs the agent to prompt for accessKey/secretAccessKey (or read them) and then write/embed those values into an authorization JSON and use them in a live authentication call, which requires the LLM to handle and potentially output secrets verbatim.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). This wrapper installs and orchestrates upstream Gangtise skills that explicitly fetch and ingest third‑party content — e.g., gangtise-kb-client (kb.py) and gangtise-file-client (report.py/get_file) which pull research reports, opinions and WeChat messages, plus gangtise-web-client (web.py) which searches the open web via open.gangtise.com and files from gts-download.obs.myhuaweicloud.com — and the workflows (described in SKILL.md and references/skill_registry.md) consume and act on that untrusted content as part of analysis, so external content can materially influence tool behavior.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.95). The installer script downloads and unpacks runtime skill code from the canonical OBS bucket (e.g. https://gts-download.obs.myhuaweicloud.com/skills/.zip) during execution, which provides required remote code that is installed and later executed by the agents — a clear runtime dependency that can control behavior.
Issues (3)
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
W012
MEDIUMUnverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
Audit Metadata