sync-repos

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to analyze code changes (which can be attacker-controlled in Pull Request or shared repository environments) and provide a 'Sync Report' that includes executable commands.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data via git diff output and the Read tool, which scans repository files (src/api/models.py, src/services/auth.py, etc.) for specific patterns.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used to separate untrusted code content from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash (arbitrary command execution), Read (arbitrary file access), and targets paths outside the current working directory (~/Desktop/repos/).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the analyzed code content is performed before determining the next actions.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill explicitly instructs the agent to generate and potentially execute commands in sibling directories (e.g., npm run generate:types in ~/Desktop/repos/deep-read-portal). This expands the agent's attack surface to multiple projects on the user's machine.
  • [Data Exposure] (LOW): The skill hardcodes and targets paths within the user's home directory (~/Desktop/repos/), which may expose information about the user's local file structure to the agent context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:01 PM