codex-system
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on the
codex execcommand to perform its tasks. These commands include flags such as--sandbox workspace-writeand--full-auto, which allow the tool to modify the local filesystem without manual intervention. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
codex executility sends instructions and code snippets to a remote model (e.g., GPT-5.4) for processing. The results are then executed or applied back to the local environment, creating a remote-to-local execution loop. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Multiple templates (e.g., in
SKILL.mdandreferences/refactoring-task.md) interpolate unvalidated user input directly into the instruction strings passed to the Codex CLI. For example, theImplementation Planningtemplate uses variables like{feature}and{relevant architecture/code}which could be used to inject malicious instructions into the subagent's context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a high vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: Processes untrusted data from git diffs, error messages, and existing source code files (e.g.,
{git diff output},{error message},{current_code}). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used to separate untrusted data from the system instructions in the command templates.
- Capability inventory: The system can write to the workspace (
workspace-write) and execute complex refactoring tasks. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the interpolated variables is evident in the configuration files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
troubleshooting.mdfile suggests installing an external package@openai/codexvia NPM. While OpenAI is a well-known entity, this specific package name is non-standard for their public offerings.
Audit Metadata