team-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of code diffs.
- Ingestion points: Change diffs gathered via
git diffare interpolated into sub-agent prompts (Security, Quality, and Test reviewers) using the{list}and{changed files list}placeholders inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide boundary markers or explicit instructions to the sub-agents to ignore instructions that may be embedded within the code being reviewed.
- Capability inventory: The reviewer agents have the ability to read and write files within the project's
.claude/directory and execute shell commands via the parent agent. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the diff content is performed before it is presented to the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several command-line tools.
- It uses
gitto retrieve repository logs and diffs. - The Test Reviewer executes
uv run pytest --cov=src, which runs the local test suite. This is a standard developer action but involves executing code contained within the project. - The Quality Reviewer invokes an unverified third-party CLI tool:
codex exec --model gpt-5.3-codex --sandbox read-only --full-auto "{question}". While it uses a read-only sandbox, this introduces a dependency on a tool not associated with a known trusted vendor.
Audit Metadata