gemini3pro
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (CRITICAL): The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions to install theuvtool using the commandcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh. This is a piped remote execution pattern which downloads and executes a script directly from the internet with the user's local privileges without verification. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The script
scripts/query_gemini.pyperforms network operations targetinghttps://grsaiapi.com/v1/chat/completions. This domain is not included in the trusted whitelist of network sources. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it integrates untrusted external data into LLM prompts without proper boundaries or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
--promptcommand-line argument and external image files provided via the--imageargument inscripts/query_gemini.py. - Boundary markers: The script lacks any delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or system instructions to ignore embedded commands within the user-provided data.
- Capability inventory: The script is capable of making outbound network requests (
urllib.request.urlopen) and writing text to the local filesystem (Path.write_text). - Sanitization: No input validation, escaping, or filtering is applied to the prompt or image metadata before transmission to the API.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata