skill-installer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill's primary purpose is to download and install external code into the agent's environment ($CODEX_HOME/skills). This allows for the execution of unverified remote scripts.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): Instructions in SKILL.md and parameters in scripts/list-skills.py allow users to specify arbitrary GitHub repositories (--repo, --url). This bypasses safety controls by allowing the agent to ingest content from untrusted external sources.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): (Indirect) The skill fetches directory names from external repositories via the GitHub API and displays them to the user or processes them. An attacker could name a directory with malicious instructions (e.g., 'ignore-previous-instructions') to manipulate the agent's behavior during the listing process (Category 8).
  • Ingestion point: scripts/list-skills.py calls the GitHub API to fetch repository contents.
  • Capability: The agent can write to the filesystem and potentially execute installed skills.
  • Boundary markers: None present. The script directly parses JSON names from the API response.
  • Sanitization: None. The script uses raw directory names directly from the remote source.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (MEDIUM): scripts/github_utils.py programmatically retrieves sensitive authentication tokens (GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN) from the environment variables to include in API headers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): scripts/list-skills.py performs local filesystem operations (os.listdir, os.path.isdir) to check for already installed skills.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:50 PM