verifying
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is instructed in Step 5 to extract commands from the "Automated Verification" section of plan files and re-run them. This capability allows for the execution of arbitrary shell commands defined within markdown documents.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection because it ingests and acts upon untrusted data from markdown files found in the file system.
- Ingestion points: Plan files located in
thoughts/*/plans/and their associated frontmatter fields. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to prevent it from following commands or logic embedded within the plan content.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (Step 5), git diff operations (Step 3), and file system searching (Step 1).
- Sanitization: The instructions provide a weak guardrail by asking the agent not to run "destructive" commands, but there is no technical validation or sanitization of the commands extracted from the plan files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Step 3 uses the
git_commitfield from a plan's frontmatter directly in agit diffcommand. If this field contains shell metacharacters, it could potentially lead to command injection.
Audit Metadata