skill-consolidator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill requires the execution of a Python script (scan_installed_skills.py) that performs directory traversal on sensitive user paths, including ~/.agents/skills, ~/.codex/skills, and paths defined in the CODEX_HOME environment variable. This is necessary for the skill's purpose but grants the agent broad visibility into the user's local tools.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The workflow (Step 6) instructs the agent to run npx skills add <owner/repo@skill-name> -g -y, which downloads and installs remote code globally on the host machine. The use of the -y flag bypasses user confirmation for installation and execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill processes content from third-party skills, creating an attack surface where malicious metadata could influence agent behavior during the consolidation process.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/scan_installed_skills.py (reads SKILL.md files from various local directories).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; descriptions and headings from external skills are directly interpolated into the overlap_report.md and inventory.json.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to write new files to the ./skills/ directory and execute shell commands (python3, npx).
  • Sanitization: Parsing is performed via simple string splitting and regex tokenization with no validation of the content being extracted.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:10 PM