active-directory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's installation instructions in
metadata.jsoninvolve downloading content from an untrusted GitHub repository (majiayu000/claude-skill-registry) usingcurl. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the
windows-command-linetool to execute high-privilege PowerShell commands such asGet-ADUser,Unlock-ADAccount, andGet-ADComputer. These commands interact directly with sensitive directory services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the output of PowerShell cmdlets (
Get-ADUser,Get-ADGroupMember,Get-ADOrganizationalUnit) and ADSI searchers defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; the agent processes raw command output without delimiters to distinguish data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
windows-command-linetool, allowing for arbitrary command execution on the host system. - Sanitization: No evidence of output sanitization or validation of AD object attributes (e.g., 'Description' or 'DisplayName' fields) which could be used by an attacker to inject instructions.
Audit Metadata