api-integration-architect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection due to its primary function of ingesting and processing data from external sources (APIs and WebSockets).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through Axios requests in
hooks/useUser.tsandhooks/useInfiniteScroll.ts, Apollo GraphQL queries inapollo-client.ts, and WebSocket messages inhooks/useWebSocket.ts. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to treat API/WebSocket responses as untrusted data, increasing the risk that embedded instructions in the data could be obeyed.
- Capability inventory: The skill definition in
SKILL.mdgrants the agent access to high-privilege tools includingBash,Task,Write, andEdit, which could be exploited if an attacker-controlled API response triggers malicious tool usage. - Sanitization: No data validation, schema enforcement, or content sanitization is present in the provided implementation examples.
Audit Metadata