xiaohongshu-reply

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses authentication cookies stored at the sensitive file path ~/.openclaw/secrets/xiaohongshu.json in check_comments.py, fetch_latest.py, and reply_fixed.py to authenticate browser sessions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted user-generated comments from the Xiaohongshu platform.
  • Ingestion points: User comments are extracted from the page body via page.text_content('body') in check_comments.py and fetch_latest.py.
  • Boundary markers: No technical boundary markers or specific formatting are used to isolate untrusted data from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Playwright to perform automated browser actions such as clicking, typing, and sending messages, and can write debug information to local files.
  • Sanitization: Extracted comment content is processed and displayed without validation or sanitization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes Playwright to automate browser interactions and injects an external script (stealth.min.js) into the browser context to evade bot detection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 27, 2026, 04:22 PM