skills/discountry/ritmex-skills/slack/Gen Agent Trust Hub

slack

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes commands to access sensitive local data. Specifically, the agent-slack auth import-desktop, auth import-chrome, and auth import-firefox commands allow the agent to extract Slack authentication tokens directly from the user's local system and browser profiles. While these are documented features, they represent a high-risk capability for credential exposure if the agent is manipulated.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection because it processes untrusted content from external Slack workspaces.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context through agent-slack message get, agent-slack message list, and agent-slack search operations which read message text and file contents from Slack.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the Slack data it retrieves.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the power to send messages, delete content, and invite external users to channels via the agent-slack channel invite --external command.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from Slack before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the agent-slack CLI tool. Although SKILL.md provides rules for the agent to follow when constructing commands (e.g., avoiding quotes or redirects), these are natural language constraints rather than technical enforcements, leaving the system open to abuse if the agent's behavior is modified by an injection attack.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 15, 2026, 01:46 PM