skills/dmythro/agent-skills/git-pr/Gen Agent Trust Hub

git-pr

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes documentation in references/allowlist.md that provides strategies to circumvent agent security controls. It instructs users to configure broad prefix-based allowlists for powerful CLI tools (gh and glab) and specifically details how to format commands to evade pattern-matching restrictions, which reduces human oversight for high-privilege operations.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: This skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It retrieves and interprets content from external sources such as pull request comments and descriptions (Ingestion points: SKILL.md and references/pr-comment-workflow.md). It lacks boundary markers or sanitization processes to differentiate between legitimate feedback and malicious instructions. Given the skill's capabilities to commit code and merge PRs (Capability inventory: gh pr merge, glab mr merge), this represents a significant attack surface.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on complex shell command execution and subshell substitutions using the GitHub and GitLab CLI tools to manage repositories and automate review workflows.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 5, 2026, 11:20 AM