github-multi-repo

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands via Bash blocks to automate repository operations, package management, and system interactions.
  • Evidence: Multiple Bash invocations in SKILL.md execute commands for listing repositories (gh repo list), cloning code, and performing file operations like cat, grep, and jq on repository data.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of code downloaded from external sources through standard package management and testing commands.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains shell logic that clones repositories and immediately executes npm update, npm install, and npm test. This allows code from the targeted repositories to run in the local environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the retrieval of source code and documentation from remote GitHub repositories.
  • Evidence: Uses gh repo clone and gh api calls throughout SKILL.md to download repository contents into the /tmp/ directory for processing.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external repositories which could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Reads package.json, CLAUDE.md, and repository metadata (topics, descriptions) from external GitHub repositories.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when reading external file content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has high privileges, including shell execution (Bash), file system writes, and network operations via the GitHub CLI.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the content retrieved from external documentation or package files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 2, 2026, 07:18 AM