github-multi-repo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands via
Bashblocks to automate repository operations, package management, and system interactions. - Evidence: Multiple
Bashinvocations inSKILL.mdexecute commands for listing repositories (gh repo list), cloning code, and performing file operations likecat,grep, andjqon repository data. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of code downloaded from external sources through standard package management and testing commands.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains shell logic that clones repositories and immediately executesnpm update,npm install, andnpm test. This allows code from the targeted repositories to run in the local environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the retrieval of source code and documentation from remote GitHub repositories.
- Evidence: Uses
gh repo cloneandgh apicalls throughoutSKILL.mdto download repository contents into the/tmp/directory for processing. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external repositories which could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Reads
package.json,CLAUDE.md, and repository metadata (topics, descriptions) from external GitHub repositories. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when reading external file content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has high privileges, including shell execution (
Bash), file system writes, and network operations via the GitHub CLI. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the content retrieved from external documentation or package files.
Audit Metadata