git-pr-workflows-pr-enhance

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation playbook contains Python code that constructs shell commands using f-strings and executes them via subprocess.run. This pattern is vulnerable to argument injection if parameters like branch names are provided by a user.
  • Evidence: The _get_changed_files and _get_change_stats methods in sub-skills/implementation-playbook.md build git diff commands using the base_branch variable.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, untrusted data (commit messages and code diffs) to generate documentation but lacks mechanisms to prevent indirect prompt injection from that data.
  • Ingestion points: sub-skills/implementation-playbook.md (processing git diffs and commit history via PRAnalyzer).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs subprocess execution (git commands) and generates structured text output.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the data ingested from the git repository before it is used to generate the final response.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 8, 2026, 02:10 PM