tool-advisor
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses sensitive configuration files. The environment discovery script reads and parses files such as
~/.claude/settings.json,.mcp.json, and~/.codex/config.json. These files typically store authentication tokens and environment configurations for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses environment variable files. The skill checks for the existence of
.envfiles and counts their lines. While it does not display the full content, accessing these files is considered high-risk as they are primary locations for storing secrets. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection vulnerability surface. The skill ingests untrusted data from the local file system by reading descriptions from other skills and agents.
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 Bash script scans
~/.claude/skills,~/.agents/skills, and~/.claude/agents, reading thedescriptionorrolefields fromSKILL.md,.md,.yaml, and.txtfiles inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The extracted descriptions are presented in Markdown format without specific sanitization or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within that content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and influence the tool-selection logic of the agent via its output recommendations.
- Sanitization: The skill uses basic string processing and Python JSON/YAML parsing to extract and truncate the description text, but does not sanitize for malicious prompt instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes a complex Bash script for local discovery. The script iterates through numerous directories and uses embedded Python one-liners to parse JSON and TOML files across the user's home directory.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata