dt-app-notebooks
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
dtctlCLI tool for managing Dynatrace notebooks, involving commands for querying (dtctl query), fetching data (dtctl get notebook), and applying configurations (dtctl apply). The instructions proactively include security guidance to wrap DQL strings in single quotes to mitigate shell-level command injection risks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes notebook JSON content (including markdown blocks and DQL queries) retrieved from external Dynatrace environments.
- Ingestion points: Notebook content is fetched using
dtctl get notebook <id>as outlined inreferences/analyzing.md. - Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to execute shell commands via
dtctland perform file system operations (writing and deletingnotebook.json) as described inreferences/create-update.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the ingested notebook content as data rather than instructions.
- Sanitization: While the skill mandates DQL syntax validation, it lacks specific instructions for sanitizing or escaping natural language instructions that might be embedded within the notebook's markdown sections.
Audit Metadata