hass-config-flow

[Skill Scanner] Outbound data post or form upload via curl/wget detected All findings: [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Outbound data post or form upload via curl/wget detected (NW002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Outbound data post or form upload via curl/wget detected (NW002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill/document is coherent with its stated purpose (managing Home Assistant via REST on a NixOS host). The primary security concern is the documented pattern that reads Home Assistant's internal auth storage and constructs JWT tokens with sudo on the NUC — a powerful, high-privilege operation that exposes secrets to stdout and to the invoking shell. There are no external download/execute chains or third-party credential forwarding observed. Recommend restricting SSH/sudo access, using long-lived tokens created through HA UI or managed flows where possible, and avoiding printing raw tokens in shared shells. Overall: functionality is legitimate but operationally high-sensitivity and should be treated carefully. LLM verification: The code/skill is functionally aligned with its intended automation of Home Assistant via its local REST API. There is no evidence of obfuscated or network-based malicious code in the provided fragment. However, it documents a high-risk practice: reading Home Assistant's internal auth storage and programmatically constructing HS256 JWT bearer tokens using per-token keys via sudo over SSH. That practice bypasses normal token creation/audit mechanisms and, combined with printing/storing tokens in