task-tracking
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/mock_agent.shscript extracts a file path from the input prompt and executes it usingbash. This dynamic execution of a path derived from text content is a risk if the input is manipulated by an attacker or a compromised agent.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection becausescripts/run_task_loop.shaggregates task data from JSON files and interpolates it into a new agent prompt without sanitization or boundary markers.\n - Ingestion points:
scripts/run_task_loop.shreads task metadata from files in the.tasks/directory which are written by previous agent actions.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. Task content is concatenated directly into the markdown prompt in the
build_promptfunction.\n - Capability inventory: The orchestrator executes
claude,gh copilot, andgitcommands, whilemock_agent.shexecutes shell scripts.\n - Sanitization: Absent. No escaping or validation is performed on task descriptions or verification commands before they are included in the prompt.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration script
scripts/run_task_loop.shuses the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag with the Claude CLI, which disables security guardrails and permission checks for the child agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Therun_task_loop.shscript automatically executesgit add -Aandgit commitusing messages derived from task descriptions and notes. This allows an agent to persist project-wide changes and commit history without direct human review of the specific files being modified.
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