skill-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
subprocessmodule to execute system commands. Specifically,scripts/run_eval.pyinvokes theclaudeCLI for evaluations, andeval-viewer/generate_review.pyrunslsofto manage local network ports. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
eval-viewer/generate_review.pystarts a local HTTP server using theHTTPServerclass to host an interactive evaluation results dashboard. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation in
scripts/run_eval.pyby writing markdown-based command descriptors to the.claude/commands/directory, which are then loaded and executed by the CLI environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the official
anthropicSDK to communicate with Anthropic's API for the description optimization workflow. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The evaluation viewer (
eval-viewer/viewer.html) fetches thexlsx.full.min.jslibrary fromcdn.sheetjs.com, a well-known service, at runtime to support browser-based spreadsheet rendering. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data as core input for its workflows.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
evals/evals.json(test prompts) andfeedback.json(user reviews). - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating this data into CLI queries or optimization prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
subprocess), filesystem writes, and network operations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of external content before it is used to influence the agent's behavior or optimize skill descriptions.
Audit Metadata