skill-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/run_eval.pyandscripts/run_loop.pyusesubprocess.Popento call theclaudecommand-line tool. This execution incorporates user-defined evaluation queries directly as arguments to subagents, creating a surface where external data influences CLI operations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill integrates the
anthropicPython package for description optimization. Additionally, theeval-viewer/viewer.htmlcomponent fetches theSheetJSlibrary from a public CDN (cdn.sheetjs.com) to enable spreadsheet rendering within the local review interface. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes test cases from
evals/evals.jsonandevals/trigger-eval.json. These queries are passed to theclaudeCLI without sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points:
evals/evals.json,evals/trigger-eval.json - Boundary markers: Absent
- Capability inventory: CLI execution via subprocess, file writing to local command directories, and local web server hosting
- Sanitization: None
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/run_eval.pyscript dynamically writes skill definitions to the.claude/commands/directory. These definitions are subsequently loaded as active skills by the environment during evaluation runs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To manage port availability,
eval-viewer/generate_review.pyexecutes thelsofutility and usesos.killto terminate existing processes on the target port. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
eval-viewer/generate_review.pyscript initiates a local HTTP server (defaulting to port 3117) to serve a review UI. It exposes files from the workspace directory and provides a POST endpoint that writes user feedback to local JSON files.
Audit Metadata