skill-creator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the subprocess module to execute system commands. Specifically, scripts/run_eval.py invokes the claude CLI for evaluations, and eval-viewer/generate_review.py runs lsof to manage local network ports.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script eval-viewer/generate_review.py starts a local HTTP server using the HTTPServer class to host an interactive evaluation results dashboard.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation in scripts/run_eval.py by writing markdown-based command descriptors to the .claude/commands/ directory, which are then loaded and executed by the CLI environment.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the official anthropic SDK to communicate with Anthropic's API for the description optimization workflow.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The evaluation viewer (eval-viewer/viewer.html) fetches the xlsx.full.min.js library from cdn.sheetjs.com, a well-known service, at runtime to support browser-based spreadsheet rendering.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by processing untrusted data as core input for its workflows.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via evals/evals.json (test prompts) and feedback.json (user reviews).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating this data into CLI queries or optimization prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (subprocess), filesystem writes, and network operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of external content before it is used to influence the agent's behavior or optimize skill descriptions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 01:18 AM