cold-outbound-optimizer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdpreamble contains instructions to executetelemetry/version_check.pyandtelemetry/telemetry_init.pyupon skill startup. These files are not provided in the skill distribution, making the code unverifiable and potentially malicious. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/cold-outbound-sender.pyusessubprocess.runto execute an external CLI tool (gog) for sending emails. The base command is configurable via the--cli-commandargument, which could be abused if the agent is manipulated into passing malicious parameters. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/competitive-monitor.pyusesurllib.requestto fetch content from arbitrary competitor URLs defined in configuration files or environment variables. This external data is then processed and integrated into the agent's context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external websites (competitor pricing and blogs) to generate intelligence reports. This creates a surface where malicious instructions hidden in those websites could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/competitive-monitor.py(viaurllib.request.urlopen). - Boundary markers: Absent. The script extracts text from HTML and passes it to the agent without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to send emails (
cold-outbound-sender.py), access the Instantly API (instantly-audit.py), and write reports to the local file system. - Sanitization: The
validate_textfunction only performs length truncation and does not filter for prompt injection patterns, althoughcold-outbound-sender.pydoes include a regex-based validator for outgoing email content to block credential exposure.
Audit Metadata