perfect-web-clone
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from external websites.
- Ingestion points:
extract_page.pycaptures raw HTML, text, and styles from user-provided URLs and saves them topage_data.json, which is then processed bychunk_content.py. - Boundary markers: The prompt defined in
SKILL.md(Phase 4) interpolates the extracted HTML directly. While it uses markdown headers to structure the input, it lacks explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the data. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the subagent
Tasktool to perform file system operations, specifically writing component code tosrc/components/*.tsx. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the extracted HTML content to remove potential instructions before passing it to the subagents.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches required Python packages and browser binaries from official registries and trusted sources during its setup phase.
- Evidence:
scripts/setup.shandSKILL.mdfacilitate the installation of dependencies viapipand the Playwright browser engine engine from standard package registries and official Playwright sources.
Audit Metadata