sympy

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Deserialization of objects using the 'pickle' module.\n
  • Evidence: The file 'references/code-generation-printing.md' demonstrates the use of 'pickle.load()' to restore saved SymPy expressions. This function is inherently insecure and can lead to arbitrary code execution if the input data is tampered with.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Runtime code compilation and execution using 'autowrap' and 'ufuncify'.\n
  • Evidence: 'references/code-generation-printing.md' includes instructions for compiling and wrapping C and Fortran code at runtime. This capability allows for the execution of dynamically generated binary code.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Conversion of symbolic expressions into executable code functions.\n
  • Evidence: The 'lambdify' and 'codegen' utilities in 'references/code-generation-printing.md' generate executable Python, C, or Fortran code from mathematical strings, creating potential vectors for code injection if input is not strictly validated.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Attack surface for processing untrusted mathematical strings through various parsers.\n
  • Ingestion points: 'parse_expr', 'parse_latex', and 'parse_mathematica' functions in 'references/code-generation-printing.md'.\n
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit warnings to the agent are implemented to isolate user-provided mathematical strings.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including file writing, code generation, and runtime compilation.\n
  • Sanitization: Although the documentation acknowledges that 'parsing user input' requires validation, no specific implementation logic is provided within the skill to prevent injection attacks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 16, 2026, 10:50 PM