claude-permissions-optimizer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local data by reading files in
~/.claude/projects/. These files contain full transcripts of previous AI sessions, which can include proprietary source code, internal system paths, and potentially sensitive data processed during earlier development tasks. While the data is processed locally, accessing this private history store constitutes a significant data exposure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled JavaScript file (
extract-commands.mjs) using Node.js to perform its analysis. Additionally, in Step 5, it instructs the agent to execute a dynamic shell command (node -e "JSON.parse(...)") to validate the integrity of thesettings.jsonfile after modification. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from historical session logs. If a previous session contained malicious patterns or crafted commands designed to bypass the script's normalization and classification logic, they could be recommended for the 'allowlist', potentially leading to the auto-approval of dangerous operations in future sessions.
- [SAFE]: The skill's primary purpose—optimizing developer workflow by managing permission prompts—is a legitimate use case. The implementation includes significant safety mitigations, such as a comprehensive blacklist of dangerous commands (e.g.,
sudo,rm,chmod 777) and mandatory user confirmation steps before any security settings are modified.
Audit Metadata