skill-lookup
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill is designed to download and install arbitrary files, including 'helper scripts (Python, shell, etc.)' and 'configuration files', from an external source to the local filesystem.
- Evidence: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to 'Save each file to the appropriate location: ... Other files -> .claude/skills/{slug}/{filename}'.
- Risk: This bypasses typical software supply chain security. If the external repository contains malicious code, the agent will install it into its own execution environment.
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill connects to 'prompts.chat', which is not a verified or trusted source according to the security guidelines.
- Evidence: Use of the
prompts.chatMCP server and toolssearch_skills/get_skillto retrieve content. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill has a high surface area for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points:
get_skilltool output from theprompts.chatAPI. - Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not define delimiters or instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the downloaded files.
- Capability inventory: File system write access, directory creation, and the ability to load future skills.
- Sanitization: None. The skill blindly saves the content returned by the API.
- Persistence Mechanisms (MEDIUM): By saving files to
.claude/skills/, the skill enables downloaded code to persist across sessions and be automatically loaded by the AI agent in the future.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata