knowledge-harvester
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
src/lib.ts, theharvestRepositoryfunction usesexecSyncto run agit clonecommand. TherepoUrlargument, supplied by the user via command-line arguments, is interpolated directly into the command string without any sanitization or validation. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a malicious URL containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|, or backticks). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill clones and extracts data from untrusted external repositories to generate documentation and knowledge bases, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External files cloned from Git repositories (src/lib.ts).
- Boundary markers: None identified in the source code or skill instructions.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (execSync), directory reading (fs.readdirSync), and file system write (safeWriteFile).
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of external content is performed before indexing or processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata