tavily-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script reads from the sensitive directory
~/.mcp-auth/to find service tokens. - Evidence: The
get_mcp_tokenfunction inscripts/search.shusesfindto recursively search for*_tokens.jsonfiles and extracts theaccess_tokenfield usingjq. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and runs a utility from a remote repository at runtime.
- Evidence:
scripts/search.shexecutesnpx -y mcp-remoteto initiate an OAuth flow if no local token is found. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several system commands for networking and data processing.
- Evidence: It uses
curlto send search queries toapi.tavily.comandmcp.tavily.com,jqfor input validation and response parsing, andbase64for processing security tokens. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Web search results are fetched via API call in
scripts/search.sh. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands in the search results.
- Capability inventory: The script can read sensitive local files (
~/.mcp-auth/), execute system commands (curl,npx), and interact with the network. - Sanitization: Absent. The search results are returned as raw text snippets without escaping or validation.
Audit Metadata