skills/family3253/skill/tavily-search/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tavily-search

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script reads from the sensitive directory ~/.mcp-auth/ to find service tokens.
  • Evidence: The get_mcp_token function in scripts/search.sh uses find to recursively search for *_tokens.json files and extracts the access_token field using jq.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and runs a utility from a remote repository at runtime.
  • Evidence: scripts/search.sh executes npx -y mcp-remote to initiate an OAuth flow if no local token is found.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several system commands for networking and data processing.
  • Evidence: It uses curl to send search queries to api.tavily.com and mcp.tavily.com, jq for input validation and response parsing, and base64 for processing security tokens.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the web, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Web search results are fetched via API call in scripts/search.sh.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands in the search results.
  • Capability inventory: The script can read sensitive local files (~/.mcp-auth/), execute system commands (curl, npx), and interact with the network.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The search results are returned as raw text snippets without escaping or validation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 15, 2026, 08:18 AM