cto
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and act upon untrusted external data (Pull Requests via
/cto-reviewand strategic goals) while having access to powerful system tools. - Ingestion points: External data enters the agent's context when it reviews pull requests or decomposes high-level goals into technical tasks as defined in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or negative constraints to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the data it is analyzing.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with access to
Bash,Read,Glob, andGreptools (SKILL.md), which could be leveraged if an injection attack successfully manipulates the agent's output. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the external data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata