firecrawl-website-design-clone
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions provide examples of executing shell commands where user-supplied URLs are directly interpolated into the command line (e.g.,
firecrawl scrape "[URL]"). This pattern is highly susceptible to command injection attacks if the agent does not strictly sanitize the input, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands by providing a crafted URL string containing shell metacharacters (e.g., using semicolons or backticks). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external websites to generate a
DESIGN.mdfile. This file is explicitly intended to serve as a 'source of truth' and 'instructions' for downstream AI coding agents. An attacker who controls a website being scraped could embed malicious instructions that, when synthesized into the design system, influence or hijack the behavior of the subsequent agent that processes the file. - Ingestion points: External website content, branding data, and metadata retrieved via the
firecrawltool. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are used to separate scraped content from the agent's synthesis logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses shell execution (
firecrawlCLI) and file system writes (creatingDESIGN.mdand storing assets in.firecrawl/). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the scraped content before it is included in the markdown output.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes logic to download remote image assets (such as signed storage links) discovered during the scrape to the local
.firecrawl/directory. This results in the agent making network requests to arbitrary third-party URLs found within scraped data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata