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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to inject "Agent Override Directives" into the project's
CLAUDE.mdfile. The stated intent is to "override Claude Code's built-in limitations," which is a documented pattern for attempting to bypass system safety constraints and operational guidelines.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow includes shell script snippets for resolving file paths usingreadlink -f. Executing shell commands on project-controlled structures (like symlinks) can be exploited if the agent does not validate the input.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes and modifiesCLAUDE.mdfiles, which are persistent instructions that influence agent behavior.\n - Ingestion points: Reads
CLAUDE.mdfrom the project directory and template files from the plugin root.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill merges content without using delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded directives.\n
- Capability inventory: Performs file reads, file writes, and shell execution (
readlink).\n - Sanitization: Absent. Content from templates and existing project files is combined and written back without validation or filtering.
Audit Metadata