cardano-cli-staking-operator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted external data (UTXOs, Pool IDs, Reward amounts) while possessing high-privilege capabilities (signing and submitting blockchain transactions).
- Ingestion points: The agent is expected to fetch
<utxo>#<index>,<pool-id-bech32>, and<reward-amount>from external sources (block explorers or APIs) to populate commands. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: Uses
Bash(cardano-cli:*)for signing (transaction sign) and submission (transaction submit), andWritefor file creation. - Sanitization: None detected. The agent directly interpolates external values into shell commands.
- [Data Exposure] (HIGH): The skill explicitly grants the agent access to sensitive private key files (
payment.skey,stake.skey). - Evidence: The workflow requires passing these files to
cardano-cli conway transaction signin multiple steps. If the agent is compromised via indirect injection, these keys could be used to authorize unauthorized transfers. - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill allows the agent to execute any
cardano-cliorcatcommand. - Evidence:
allowed-toolsincludesBash(cardano-cli:*)andBash(cat:*), which provides broad control over the local Cardano node and file reading capabilities beyond just the staking workflow.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata