codexloop
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
run_shell_commandfunction incli.pyexecutes shell commands usingsubprocess.run(..., shell=True). This includes verification commands generated by the AI planner and bootstrap or doctor commands defined in the local project configuration. Additionally, theinit_repofunction incli.pyperforms achmod(0o755)operation on thedoctor.shscript to make it executable before it is called by the harness. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to its reliance on untrusted repository data for task generation.
- Ingestion points: The
collect_planner_contextfunction incli.pyaggregates file lists and content snippets from various repository locations (e.g.,configs/,scripts/,docs/) to provide context to the AI. - Boundary markers: Data is enclosed in XML-style tags like
<repo-context>and<implementation-plan>within the prompt strings defined inbuild_planner_promptandbuild_worker_prompt. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, manage git worktrees and branches, and modify repository files.
- Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the repository-sourced data to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the AI's task generation or injecting malicious shell commands into the generated task backlog.
Audit Metadata