codexloop

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The run_shell_command function in cli.py executes shell commands using subprocess.run(..., shell=True). This includes verification commands generated by the AI planner and bootstrap or doctor commands defined in the local project configuration. Additionally, the init_repo function in cli.py performs a chmod(0o755) operation on the doctor.sh script to make it executable before it is called by the harness.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to its reliance on untrusted repository data for task generation.
  • Ingestion points: The collect_planner_context function in cli.py aggregates file lists and content snippets from various repository locations (e.g., configs/, scripts/, docs/) to provide context to the AI.
  • Boundary markers: Data is enclosed in XML-style tags like <repo-context> and <implementation-plan> within the prompt strings defined in build_planner_prompt and build_worker_prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, manage git worktrees and branches, and modify repository files.
  • Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the repository-sourced data to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the AI's task generation or injecting malicious shell commands into the generated task backlog.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 12, 2026, 02:58 AM