agent-manager
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill evaluates conditional 'when' expressions in
scripts/services/work_schedule.pyusingsubprocess.run(cmd, shell=True). This allows arbitrary shell command execution based on strings defined in agent configuration files. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/main.py, thewrite_start_command_scriptfunction generates shell scripts from configuration strings, applies executable permissions (chmod 755), and executes them. This is a form of dynamic script generation and execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages system persistence by programmatically modifying the user's crontab through
scripts/schedule_helper.py. While intended for scheduling agent tasks, this capability allows the skill to schedule arbitrary recurring system commands. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: There is extensive use of
subprocess.runthroughoutscripts/tmux_helper.pyandscripts/main.pyto manage tmux sessions. This constitutes the core functionality but provides a significant attack surface if the configuration files (e.g.,agents/*.md) are manipulated. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references
@google/gemini-clivianpxinproviders/__init__.py. This is a reference to a well-known service from a trusted organization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes indirect injection risks (Category 8) because it ingests data from
agents/*.mdandAGENTS.mdfiles without boundary markers or sanitization, and maps these inputs to powerful capabilities such asshell=Trueexecution and file writing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata