Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF files that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent.\n
- Ingestion points: PDFs are processed by
scripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/check_fillable_fields.py, and referenced inSKILL.mdviapypdfandpdfplumber.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are used when extracting text for the agent.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute various subprocesses (e.g.,
qpdf,pdftotext,pdftk) and has extensive read/write access to the local file system.\n - Sanitization: Extracted content is passed to the agent without sanitization or filtering.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pymodifies the behavior of thepypdflibrary at runtime.\n - Evidence: The
monkeypatch_pydpf_methodfunction replacespypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedwith a custom implementation to address a bug in the library's handling of selection lists.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several external command-line utilities for core functionality.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreference.mdinstruct the agent to useqpdf,pdftotext,pdfimages,pdftoppm, andpdftkfor tasks like merging, splitting, and text extraction.
Audit Metadata