design-readiness-check
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests untrusted data from the user (design trees) and interpolates it directly into the prompts of multiple sub-agents (
branch-checker,assumption-checker,failure-checker,risk-checker). - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
{{DESIGN_TREE}}and{{CONTEXT}}placeholders in the sub-agent templates located in theagents/directory. - Boundary markers: Absent. The templates do not use delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple backticks with clear warnings) to separate the untrusted user content from the sub-agent's instructions, making it easier for malicious data to override agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The sub-agents are configured with file-system access tools (
Read,Grep,Glob), which could be abused if an injection attack successfully tricks the agent into reading sensitive files outside the design scope. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering of the content within the
{{DESIGN_TREE}}variable before it is passed to the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata