stitch-design-system
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a local bash script
scripts/fetch-stitch.shwith a download URL as an argument. The URL is retrieved dynamically from the Stitch API (htmlCode.downloadUrl). If the external service provides a maliciously crafted URL containing shell metacharacters, it could lead to command injection during the execution phase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources (Stitch API and downloaded HTML) which constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the Stitch API (via
get_projectandget_screen) and the downloaded filetemp/source.htmlinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the agent when parsing the external design content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool for script execution and theWritetool for creating CSS and Markdown artifacts across all processing steps. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation logic for the content fetched from the remote Stitch platform before it is used to generate code.
Audit Metadata