stitch-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses an iterative 'baton' system where the agent reads the prompt for its next task from
next-prompt.md. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, as instructions or data from project files are directly interpolated into the prompts for the Stitch MCP generation tool. - Ingestion points:
next-prompt.md,DESIGN.md, andSITE.md(SKILL.md Step 1 & 2). - Boundary markers: The skill uses bold headers (e.g., 'DESIGN SYSTEM (REQUIRED):') but lacks explicit instructions to the model to ignore any embedded malicious directions within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has
Bash(command execution),Write(file modification), and the ability to trigger code/UI generation via thestitchtoolset. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the content read from the markdown files before it is used in the generation prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute local scripts and start development services. - Evidence: Execution of
bash scripts/fetch-stitch.shto download generated assets (SKILL.md Step 3). - Evidence: Use of
npx serveto launch a local web server for visual verification (SKILL.md Step 4.5). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches HTML and image assets from remote URLs provided by the Stitch MCP tool.
- Evidence: Downloads content from
[htmlCode.downloadUrl]using a local bash script. These URLs typically point to Google Cloud Storage (GCS) as part of the Stitch service ecosystem.
Audit Metadata