The Agent Skills Directory

[DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill attempts to access a file path located outside of its own package environment.
Evidence: In SKILL.md, the instructions mandate reading ~/.claude/skills/ml-paper-writing/references/knowledge/paper-miner-writing-memory.md before drafting responses.
Impact: This represents a cross-skill data exposure risk, as it targets files within the user's local application configuration directory that may contain sensitive writing history or private data from other tasks.
[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
Ingestion points: SKILL.md explicitly instructs the agent to ingest 'reviewer comments text or file' provided by the user.
Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the external comments as data or to ignore any embedded instructions.
Capability inventory: The agent has read access to multiple local reference files (templates, strategies, tone guidelines) and the capability to generate and export complex rebuttal documents.
Sanitization: Absent. No validation or filtering is performed on the input text.
Impact: An attacker could embed malicious instructions within the reviewer comments which the agent might follow while performing the analysis.

review-response