kata-brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
node -eto programmatically read and modify the~/.claude/settings.jsonfile. While this is used to enable the required 'Agent Teams' experimental feature for the brainstorming session, executing shell commands to modify global configuration files is a sensitive operation. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses
~/.claude/settings.json, which is a sensitive configuration file that may contain environment variables or other agent-specific configuration. The skill reads from and writes to this file to update theCLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMSflag. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it aggregates content from various repository files (such as
README.md,.planning/PROJECT.md, and issue descriptions) and injects this data directly into the prompts for sub-agents (Explorers and Challengers). - Ingestion points: Content is read from
.planning/PROJECT.md,.planning/ROADMAP.md,.planning/issues/open/*.md,.planning/STATE.md,README.md, andpackage.json. - Boundary markers: The collected brief is inserted into sub-agent templates using the
[CONDENSED PROJECT BRIEF]placeholder without any XML delimiters, markdown blocks, or explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings to prevent the data from being interpreted as commands by the sub-agents. - Capability inventory: Sub-agents spawned by this skill have the ability to explore the codebase using tools, update tasks, and write files to the project directory.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content read from the repository before it is interpolated into the prompts for the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata