competency-framework-translator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates user-supplied framework descriptors and context directly into the instruction prompt without isolation.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data through the
framework_reference,target_context, andframework_textvariables inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or markers (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) used to separate the external data from the skill's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill itself does not define tool access, but the agent's underlying capabilities could be manipulated by instructions embedded in the external text.
- Sanitization: The prompt contains no instructions to ignore or sanitize embedded commands within the processed inputs.
Audit Metadata