critical-thinking-task-designer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates unvalidated user strings into the core instruction prompt without robust boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied fields in
SKILL.mdsuch ascurriculum_topic,learner_stage,discipline_or_subject,knowledge_baseline,existing_learning_targets, andthinking_focus. - Boundary markers: The prompt uses bold headers to label inputs but lacks formal delimiters (e.g., XML tags or clear isolation markers) to prevent user-supplied text from being interpreted as instructions by the underlying model.
- Capability inventory: The skill does not possess any dangerous capabilities; it has no file system access, network connectivity, or subprocess execution tools across any of its components.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization performed on the user-provided data before it is inserted into the prompt template.
Audit Metadata