metacognitive-prompt-library
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill constructs its final prompt by interpolating several user-supplied fields directly into the instruction block, which is a standard pattern for template-based agents but introduces an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: Data from the
task_description,student_level,metacognitive_focus,subject_area,student_profiles, andtask_phaseinput fields inSKILL.mdare used to populate the model's instructions. - Boundary markers: The prompt template lacks robust delimiters (such as XML tags or unique string markers) and specific instructions to the model to ignore any command-like text within the user-provided inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill's functionality is limited to text generation and lacks access to sensitive system operations like file system modification, network requests, or shell execution, which limits the potential for harm.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or filtering to remove potentially malicious instructions from the user-provided text.
Audit Metadata