fix-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it fetches and interprets untrusted content from GitHub PR comments to guide its code-editing behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves comment bodies via the
gh apicommand in Step 3. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the PR comment content strictly as data or to ignore potential instructions embedded within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Edit,Write, andBashpermissions, allowing it to modify the local codebase based on the parsed comments. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the comment content before it is used to generate code fixes.
- Mitigation: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to "Show the proposed fix to the user and ask for explicit confirmation before applying it," which serves as a significant human-in-the-loop safeguard.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local system commands using the GitHub CLI (
gh) to gather PR information and fetch API data. - Evidence: Step 1 uses
gh pr view, Step 2 usesgh --version, and Step 3 usesgh api. These are standard operations for interacting with GitHub services.
Audit Metadata