paseo-committee
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the
$ARGUMENTSplaceholder to interpolate user input into the context provided to the primary agent and its sub-agents. This allows a user to potentially provide instructions that attempt to override the skill's intended behavior or influence the reasoning of the committee agents. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as a conduit for untrusted user input, passing it to sub-agents created through the
create_agenttool. - Ingestion points: User input is captured via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.mdand included in the problem-level prompt. - Boundary markers: The skill includes a mandatory 'no-edits' suffix ('This is analysis only. Do NOT edit, create, or delete any files. Do NOT write code.') that is appended to every prompt sent to committee members, providing a defensive boundary against instruction-based attacks on the sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
list_profilestool to read agent configurations and thecreate_agenttool to execute secondary reasoning processes. - Sanitization: No explicit validation, filtering, or escaping of the
$ARGUMENTSstring is performed before it is interpolated into the prompts.
Audit Metadata