arize-trace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and display trace and span data from the Arize platform. This data includes user-generated content such as LLM inputs, outputs, and retrieval documents, which constitutes a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
ax spans exportandax traces exportcommands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill includes a specific 'untrusted content guardrail' in
SKILL.mdthat explicitly instructs the agent to treat exported data as raw text and not to interpret it as instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
axCLI to perform network operations (connecting toapi.arize.comandflight.arize.com) and file system operations (writing to the.arize-tmp-tracesdirectory). - Sanitization: The skill relies on the provided instructional guardrail to prevent the agent from acting on malicious content embedded in the logs; no programmatic sanitization of the JSON content is mentioned.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
arize-ax-clitool. The documentation inreferences/ax-setup.mdprovides instructions for installing or upgrading this package via standard registries usinguv,pipx, orpip. - [PERSISTENCE]: In
references/ax-profiles.md, the skill suggests that users persist their configuration, such as theARIZE_SPACEidentifier, by adding export commands to shell profile files like~/.zshrcor~/.bashrc. While this is a common practice for CLI configuration, it involves modifying shell startup scripts.
Audit Metadata