make-repo-contribution
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is highly susceptible to indirect injection because it explicitly instructs the agent to find and follow rules located in external, potentially untrusted repository files.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
README.md,CONTRIBUTING.md, project documentation, and issue/PR templates from the repository (documented inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to treat repository-provided guidelines as untrusted or to isolate them from the agent's core system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the authority to create branches, commit code, push changes, and create pull requests.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the instructions found in the repository is performed before the agent acts on them.
- Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill directs the agent to execute shell commands based on repository requirements for building and testing.
- Evidence: The 'Tasks' section in
SKILL.mdand the 'Testing' section inassets/pr-template.mdprompt the agent to run linters, unit tests, and build processes. - Risk: An attacker could modify a repository's build or test scripts (e.g., in a
package.jsonorMakefile) to execute malicious code when the agent attempts to satisfy contribution prerequisites.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata