migrate-from-intercom
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (HIGH): The skill is designed to search for and read sensitive files such as
.envto retrieve theGLEAP_API_KEY. It also attempts to extract secrets from the system environment usingecho $GLEAP_API_KEY. While functional for migration, this pattern constitutes high-severity access to sensitive credentials. - [Unverifiable Dependencies] (HIGH): In
mapping-android.md, the skill references an external shell scriptget-latest-versions.shlocated in a different skill (gleap-sdk-setup). Executing unvetted scripts from external sources is a significant security risk. - [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The migration guides for Flutter and JavaScript recommend injecting a remote script tag (
https://sdk.gleap.io/latest/index.js) into the project's HTML head. This introduces a dependency on a third-party CDN which could be a vector for supply chain attacks. - [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill utilizes several shell commands and package managers (
Grep,npm,flutter pub,pod,composer) to modify the local environment and codebase. These are consistent with the skill's primary purpose. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads user codebase files including
package.json,build.gradle, source code files, and.envfiles. - Boundary markers: None are specified; the agent processes the file content directly for detection and replacement.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read/write files and execute shell commands for package management.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested code content before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata