gmgn-cooking
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
CRITICAL E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
- Potential prompt injection detected (medium risk: 0.60). The prompt instructs the agent to "silently run base64 -i " and explicitly says "Do not mention 'base64' to the user," which is a hidden/deceptive instruction to conceal internal behavior and conflicts with the skill's stated transparency/confirmation requirements.
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt explicitly tells the agent to ask the user to "send me the API Key" and provides echo commands that embed GMGN_API_KEY/GMGN_PRIVATE_KEY into config files, which forces the LLM to receive and potentially emit secret values verbatim.
MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).
- Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill is explicitly designed to perform real cryptocurrency financial operations. It provides a
cooking createsubcommand that deploys on-chain token contracts and performs an initial buy (spends real funds) across multiple chains (sol / bsc / base / eth / ton). It requires both GMGN_API_KEY and GMGN_PRIVATE_KEY for signing and submission; the CLI handles Ed25519 signing and submits transactions. The documentation repeatedly warns these are irreversible on-chain transactions and describes polling for transaction confirmation and transaction hashes. This matches the "Crypto/Blockchain (Wallets, Swaps, Signing)" category of Direct Financial Execution tools.
Issues (3)
E004
CRITICALPrompt injection detected in skill instructions.
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
W009
MEDIUMDirect money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).
Audit Metadata