bmad-agent-marketing-influencer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file references/shared-patterns.md contains instructions for the agent to install external dependencies using shell commands such as npx skills add and npm install -g. While these target trusted sources, they represent arbitrary command execution for environment setup.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In references/influencer-identification.md, the skill defines shell commands for the agent-browser tool that incorporate dynamic, user-influenced parameters (e.g., {niche-keyword}). This represents a potential surface for command injection if the underlying platform does not properly sanitize these inputs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download and installation of the agent-browser tool from Vercel Labs' official GitHub repository.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external websites (TikTok, Instagram, YouTube) via the agent-browser tool.
  • Ingestion points: Web content is retrieved using agent-browser get text body in references/influencer-identification.md.
  • Boundary markers: None are explicitly used to delimit external content from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write files (saving research and reports) and perform network operations via the browser tool.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering logic is defined for the ingested web data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 1, 2026, 07:41 PM