bmad-agent-marketing-influencer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file
references/shared-patterns.mdcontains instructions for the agent to install external dependencies using shell commands such asnpx skills addandnpm install -g. While these target trusted sources, they represent arbitrary command execution for environment setup. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
references/influencer-identification.md, the skill defines shell commands for theagent-browsertool that incorporate dynamic, user-influenced parameters (e.g.,{niche-keyword}). This represents a potential surface for command injection if the underlying platform does not properly sanitize these inputs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download and installation of the
agent-browsertool from Vercel Labs' official GitHub repository. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external websites (TikTok, Instagram, YouTube) via the
agent-browsertool. - Ingestion points: Web content is retrieved using
agent-browser get text bodyinreferences/influencer-identification.md. - Boundary markers: None are explicitly used to delimit external content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write files (saving research and reports) and perform network operations via the browser tool.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering logic is defined for the ingested web data.
Audit Metadata