marketing-influencer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill attempts to install an external package globally and download browser binaries at runtime.
- Evidence:
npm install -g agent-browser && npx playwright install chromiuminSKILL.mdis triggered if the tool is missing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to automate browser research and system-level package management.
- Evidence: Multiple instances of
agent-browsercommands and annpm installcommand in the 'Research Mode' section ofSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by fetching and parsing text content from social media search results and user profiles.
- Ingestion points:
agent-browser get text bodycommands inSKILL.mdwhich retrieve content from TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution (
agent-browser,npm), file reads (./brands/), and network access via the browser tool. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any filtering or validation of the fetched HTML/text content before use.
Audit Metadata